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SOCIAL STATUS AND BADGE DESIGN
NICOLE IMMORLICA, GREG STODDARD, AND VASILIS SYRGKANIS
Abstract. Many websites rely on user-generated content to provide value to consumers.
These websites typically incentivize participation by awarding users badges based on their
contributions. While these badges typically have no explicit value, they act as symbols of
social status within a community. In this paper, we consider the design of badge mechanisms
for the objective of maximizing the total contributions made to a website. Users exert costly
effort to make contributions and, in return, are awarded with badges. A badge is only
valued to the extent that it signals social status and thus badge valuations are determined
endogenously by the number of users who earn each badge. The goal of this paper is
to study the design of optimal and approximately badge mechanisms under these status
valuations. We characterize badge mechanisms by whether they use a coarse partitioning
scheme, i.e. awarding the same badge to many users, or use a fine partitioning scheme, i.e.
awarding a unique badge to most users. We find that the optimal mechanism uses both fine
partitioning and coarse partitioning. When status valuations exhibit a decreasing marginal
value property, we prove that coarse partitioning is a necessary feature of any approximately
optimal mechanism. Conversely, when status valuations exhibit an increasing marginal value
property, we prove that fine partitioning is necessary for approximate optimality.
1. Introduction
A number of popular websites are driven by user-generated content. Review sites such
as Yelp and TripAdvisor need users to rate and review restaurants and hotels, social news
aggregators like Reddit rely on users to submit and vote upon articles from around the web,
and question and answer sites like Stack Overflow and Quora depend on their users to ask
good questions and provide good answers. One threat to the success of such sites is the free-
rider problem, that not enough users will the expend the effort to meaningfully contribute.
Stack Overflow, a very successful user-driven Q&A site for programming questions, addresses
this free-riding problem with a system of reputation points and badges. A badge is a small
symbol displayed on a user’s profile and is awarded for accomplishing tasks like asking ten
questions or providing the best answer to a given question.
While badge systems have existed for a long time in the form of military medals, boy
scout badges, customer status programs, etc, they have become particularly popular in web
communities over the past few years. The Huffington Post recently implemented a badge
system to reward actions from their commenters; these badges are now prominently displayed
next to usernames in the comment sections. Amazon awards a badge for being in top 1000
reviewers, another for being in the top 100, etc. The Mozilla Foundation is leading an
initiative called the Open Badge Project which hopes to set an open standard for awarding,
collecting, and displaying badges across any platform throughout the web. Their ultimate
goal is to provide a persistent collection of badges that can be displayed anywhere on the
web as a proof of acquired skills and achievements.
With all this excitement and energy surrounding badge systems, one fundamental question
emerges: why do people care about badges? On the surface level, a badge is just a small
sticker or group of pixels on a profile, so why should it be that badges incentivize people
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to exert effort to earn them? This is the very reason that makes such systems attractive to
platforms; they are getting “something for nothing” by awarding badges which cost them
nothing, and in return they receive increased contributions from their users. Despite the lack
of an explicit value, it is quite clear that people are motivated by badges [1]. In this work,
we take the view that badges (or any virtual reward) do not have fixed values but that their
value is endogenously determined by how many others have earned the same badge (or a
better one). The most valuable badges not only signal that a user has accomplished some
impressive task but also signal that relatively few users have earned them. Top level badges,
such as the “gold” badges on Stack Overflow or the “Superuser” badge on Huffington Post,
are described as difficult to earn and only awarded to the most committed users. As more
users earn a particular badge, that badge loses its ability to distinguish a member within the
community and thus becomes less valuable. This work studies optimal badge design when
badges are a means for establishing social status.
While it has long been accepted that people are motivated and affected by concerns of social
status, the exact role and nature of status remains an issue of contention. In particular, there’s
a debate over whether status is an end in itself, or whether it serves as a useful proxy for
some other objective. On the web, a variety of status concerns arise from the idiosyncrasies
of different communities. On Wikipedia, there’s evidence that high status editors enjoy a
higher chance of having their suggestions adopted by administrators [14]. The Huffington
Post gives increased attention to comments made by users who have earned the “pundit”
badge by placing those comments at the top of each discussion. Top reviewers on Amazon
receive large amount of free products from manufacturers. It could also be that users simply
value having high status because it makes them feel good, or signals something about their
abilities or contributions to others. Rather than study the provenance of these concerns
across different platforms, we seek to understand how different properties of status concerns
should influence the design of badge mechanisms.
The goal of this paper is to examine the incentives created by social status concerns and to
study the design of optimal social-psychological incentive schemes. In practice, there is a wide
variety of such mechanisms such as awarding digital badges for accomplishments, assigning
titles to users, maintaining a leaderboard where users are ranked by accomplishments, etc.
The key feature of these schemes is that they induce a partitioning of users into an ordered
set of status classes; users that earn the no reward are in the lowest status class while users
that earn the highest reward are in the top status class. We abstract away the particular
details of rewards and focus on the mechanism’s role in assigning users into these status
classes. Throughout this paper, we generically refer to a badge as the assigned status class
of a user.
The high level question we study is how should a designer award badges to maximize
the amount of content contributed by the users of a website. We answer this question by
using a game-theoretic model where users strategically choose the amount they contribute
to maximize their utility, which is defined as the status value they receive minus their cost
of producing that content.Our goal is to give a broad characterization of the design of badge
mechanisms with social status concerns. Our work addresses these the three main questions:
(1) What is the badge mechanism that maximizes the expected amount of content con-
tributed by users?
(2) What can be done with simple badge mechanisms? In some settings, the optimal
mechanism may not be possible to implement. Perhaps the optimal mechanism is
more complex than desired or imposes too much of an information requirement on
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the part of the designer. Motivated by these constraints, we study the performance
of two variants of commonly-used badge mechanisms.
(3) How does the nature of status valuations affect the design of good mechanisms?
Rather than assume a specific form of status valuations, we allow for users to have
some general status value function and examine how the properties of this function
influence the (approximate) optimality of the badge mechanisms we study.
1.1. Our Contributions. We model and analyze a game of incomplete information where
users simultaneously make costly contributions to a site. Each user has some privately-known
ability that determines their cost of contributing to the site. Based on their contributions,
each users is assigned a single badge out of an ordered set of badges. Users only derive value
from these badges because of the status they confer, where a user’s status is defined by the
fraction of users that have earned an equal or better badge. A user’s value for this status is
given by some function S (·).
We study the design of optimal and approximately mechanisms in this setting. We define
a badge mechanism as a function that awards badges to users based on their contribution
and the contribution of all other users. The objective of the designer is to maximize the
expected sum of contributions received from all users. We note that we can extend this
framework to incorporate objectives such as as maximizing contributions that are at least
of a certain quality (to mitigate agents submitting large amounts of low quality content) by
redefining what constitutes an acceptable contribution. We analyze this optimization problem
by using the well-established connection between crowdsourcing contests and all-pay auctions
and tools from optimal mechanism design theory. We show that the status value functions
ends up playing the role of an allocation function in a standard mechanism design setting.
However, relative to a standard mechanism design setting, there are significant constraints
on the design problem. The endogenous nature of status valuations introduces negative
externalities between users; as more users earn a particular badge, the status value of that
badge decreases. These negative externalities constrain the set of feasible status allocations
implementable in equilibrium.
We first prove that the optimal mechanism is a leaderboard with a cutoff. This mechanism
assigns the lowest badge to any user whose contribution falls below a certain threshold, and
assigns unique badges to the remaining users in decreasing order of their contribution. The
optimality of this mechanism is not sensitive to the status value function S (·). On the one
hand, this is a nice property for the optimal mechanism to have. On the other hand, studying
the optimal mechanism does not elucidate the role of the status function. Indeed, we show
that this insensitivity to the status value function does not extend to approximately optimal
badge mechanisms. We examine the effects of the convexity of the status value function
through two commonly-used types of badge mechanisms. We find that the “shape” of status
valuations, i.e. whether S (·) is concave or convex with respect to status, plays a large role
in the design of approximately optimal mechanisms.
The first of these type of mechanisms is an absolute threshold mechanism, which is a
mechanism defined by a vector of contribution thresholds such that the badge each user
earns is determined by the maximum threshold that his contribution exceeds. We prove
that an absolute threshold mechanism with a single threshold achieves a 4-approximation to
the optimal mechanism for concave and linear status functions. For strictly convex status
valuations, no absolute threshold mechanism can achieve a finite approximation with any
constant number of badges. This indicates that any approximately optimal absolute threshold
mechanism must increase the number of badges it uses as the user population increases but
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we show that the necessary number of badges to achieve a constant approximation is only
logarithmic in a natural parameter of the status value function.
We finally study the leaderboard mechanism with no cut-off, i.e. the mechanism that
assigns unique badges to all users in decreasing order of their contribution. We prove the
leaderboard mechanism is a 2-approximation to the optimal mechanism for any convex value
function. However, this mechanism cannot achieve any finite approximation for the class of
concave valuations. Contrasting this result with the optimal mechanism demonstrates the
necessity of having some threshold below which any user earns the lowest badge.
When viewed all together, these results give an important intuition regarding the parti-
tioning of users. The function of a mechanism is to assign badges to users which partitions
users into different sets of ordered status classes. To use the language of [15], a fine parti-
tioning of users is one where users (or most of them) are assigned a unique badge, while a
coarse partitioning of users is one where many users are assigned to the same badge. The
optimal mechanism, the leaderboard with a cutoff, uses both types of partitioning; all users
above the contribution threshold are finely partitioned while all users below the threshold
are coarsely partitioned.
For the class of convex valuations, fine partitioning is necessary to achieve any reasonable
approximation. With convex valuations, the marginal value of increasing a user’s status in-
creases as his status improves, so users are naturally motivated to climb as high as possible.
Any approximately optimal mechanism must have enough badges to allow users to distin-
guish themselves. Both the optimal mechanism and the the leaderboard mechanism have
this property but the absolute threshold mechanism with a single threshold does not. The
partitioning in this latter mechanism is too coarse to achieve any good approximation
For the class of concave valuations, coarse partitioning among the lower-ability users is
necessary for approximate optimality. With concave valuations, the marginal status value
diminishes as users improve their status and hence the natural motivations for users is to
avoid being at the bottom of the population but not to care too much for rising further.
In extreme instances, most of a user’s marginal status value is gained from moving up from
the lowest status. In these settings, a mechanism must coarsely partition all low-ability
users into a single badge to provide sufficient incentive for high-ability users to earn the next
highest badge. The leaderboard with a cut-off and the single absolute threshold mechanism
both implement this coarse partitioning of low ability users but the leaderboard mechanism
partitions too finely to achieve any good approximation.
In our last section, we extend our analysis to a more general definition of status. In prior
sections, we assume that users strictly prefer having a higher badge than having the same
badge as another user. We loosen this assumption about how users value “ties” and show that
the optimal mechanism can be quite complex in this general setting. However, we show that
both of approximately optimal mechanisms that we study maintain their simple structure
and performance guarantees in this more complex setting.
2. Related Work
There’s a growing literature on the role and design of incentives systems [8, 10, 11, 7, 9,
13, 3, 15]. These papers consider how to award badges, virtual points, a monetary prize, or
viewer attention on a website in order to maximize either the total quantity of contributions
or the largest contribution. The general sense of the literature suggests that when agents
have exogenous values for their rewards, coarse reward systems do well at maximizing these
objectives. The optimal choice depends heavily on the modeling assumptions. Most of these
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papers consider varying informational assumptions about the environment and derive that
coarse mechanisms (often extremely coarse mechanisms with just two reward types, winners
and losers) are either optimal or approximately optimal.1 These informational assumptions
include: abilities of users are private [2, 5] or publicly known [8], noisy observations as
to the size or quality of the contribution [10, 9]. However, most of these papers have an
exogenous well-defined user utility for the associated rewards.2 Our work focuses on relaxing
assumptions about the exact functional form of the user utility and instead investigates the
impact of the shape of utility on reward systems. Consistent with prior work, we find that
coarse reward systems can be optimal for a wide class of valuations but in contrast to prior
work, they can do arbitrarily poorly when valuations are endogenously determined by the
scarcity of a reward.
The paper most closely related to ours is that of [15]. We consider the same model of a game
where users are motivated by social status. The key difference is that they assume a specific
status function. They prove that a fine partitioning of agents is optimal, and show that a
coarse partitioning of agents is a 2-approximation (under certain distributional assumptions).
We consider general status value functions (theirs is a special case of the class we consider in
section 8) and in doing so, develop a more general theory of optimal mechanisms for status
contests. Notably, we prove that the optimal mechanism in their setting can be an arbitrarily
bad for a large class of status valuations. On a technical level, [13] use the mathematical
connection between allocation in a first-price auction and a consumer’s expected social status
to analyze a game of consumer choice. Although the goal in our paper is different, we extend
this connection to a wider class of social status functions and allocations resulting from a
wider class of status mechanisms.
3. Badge Mechanisms and Social Status
We now introduce our game theoretic model of contributions to a user-driven site. Users
contribute content to the site but these contributions cost them effort. There is a population of
n users and an ordered set ofm+1 badges, where badges are ordered such thatm ≻ m−1... ≻
1 ≻ 0. Each user simultaneously makes a contribution bi ∈ R+ to a badge mechanism. The
badge mechanism maps this profile of contributions to an assignment of badges for each user.
Formally, a badge mechanism is a function r : R+× (R+)n−1 → {1, ...,m} where we say user
i earns badge r(bi, b−i).
A user’s utility is a function of his status, which determines his value, and his ability, which
determines his cost. The status of a user i is defined as the fraction of users who have earned
an equal or better badge. We denote this fraction by ti =
|{j 6=i: r(bj ,b−j)r(bi,b−i)}|
n−1 . A user’s
status value is given by a function S (·) : [0, 1] → R+ of ti. We assume that S(1) = 0, i.e.
users in the lowest status class derive a status value of 0. The ability vi of user i is private
information and drawn independently and identically from a common distribution F with
support over [0, v¯] and density f. We assume F is atomless and regular.3 If a user with ability
vi contributes bi, then he incurs a cost of
bi
vi
. A user’s utility for contributing bi is quasi-linear
1Interestingly, [5] also show that their reward system doesn’t “overproduce” in the sense that the largest
contribution is at least half the size of the total quantity of contributions.
2Two notable exceptions are [15, 8] who consider a general convex value for the reward.
3This is a weaker assumption than the monotone hazard rate condition, assumed in Moldovanu et al. [15];
see Section 4 for a formal definition.
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in his status value and his cost of contribution:
S(ti)− bi
vi
.
The goal of the designer is to maximize the sum of the contributions of all users
∑
i bi.
We note that we can extend this framework to incorporate objectives such as as maximiz-
ing contributions that are at least of a certain quality (to mitigate agents submitting large
amounts of low quality content) by redefining what a contribute constitutes. The important
assumption about the objective is that the designer wants to maximize the total sum of
contributions. 4
Badge Mechanisms. While our definition of a badge mechanism allows for a number
of ways to award social status as a function of contributions, we study a few canonical
mechanisms in this paper.
Definition 1 (Absolute Threshold Mechanism). An absolute threshold mechanism is defined
by a set of m thresholds θ = (θ1, . . . , θm), with θ1 ≤ . . . ≤ θm, such that user i is awarded
badge j ∈ {0, . . . ,m} if bi ∈ [θj , θj+1). By convention, θ0 = 0 and θm+1 =∞.
Definition 2 (Leaderboard Mechanism). The leaderboard mechanism assigns each user a
distinct badge among a set of m = n badges in decreasing order of their contributions. If user
i contributes the jth highest amount (where m is highest amount and 1 is the lowest), he is
assigned badge j. In the event that two users submit equal levels of contributions, the tie is
broken randomly.
The key difference between the above two mechanisms is the badge that user i receives
in an absolute threshold mechanism depends only his own contribution bi and not on the
contributions of the remaining players. By contrast, badge that a player earns in a leader-
board mechanism depends only the position of his contribution within the ordered list of all
contributions, but not on the amount of his contribution. The next mechanism we define is
an example of a hybrid of these two mechanisms.
Definition 3 (Leaderboard with a Cut-Off). The leaderboard with a cut-off mechanism is
defined by a single threshold θ such that any user who submits bi < θ is assigned badge 0. The
remaining users are assigned badges in decreasing order of contributions, as in the leaderboard
mechanism.
We note that this is not an exhaustive list of mechanisms, nor are we the first to construct
such definitions. Another common mechanism is a relative threshold badge, studied in [15],
where users are assigned based on their coarse position within the ordered list of contributions.
For example, a user will receive the top badge if he is in the top half of contributors and
the lowest badge otherwise. We focus on the three mechanisms defined above because they
give a good sketch of the properties of (approximately) optimal mechanisms across a range
of environments.
Status Value. Our goal in this paper is to characterize the optimality of various badge
mechanisms for different regimes of status valuations. We divide status valuation functions
into the classes of linear functions, concave functions, and convex functions. Each regime has
a natural interpretation; for concave status, a user’s marginal gain in status value decreases
as he increases his standing in society. For convex, the marginal gain in status value increases
as a user increases his standing, and in linear, the marginal gain in status value is constant.
4Alternative objectives could be maximizing the quality of the single best solution such as in [5] and [2].
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4. Preliminaries and Connection to Optimal Auction Design
In this section, we briefly review a few classic results from optimal mechanism design which
we make extensive use of in our paper.
Optimal Mechanism Design. In the standard auction design problem, there are n
agents competing for a single unit of a divisible good. The goal is to design an auction
that maximizes revenue or total payments. Each agent i has a value vi per unit of the item
drawn IID from an atomless distribution F with support [0, v¯] and density f (·). Under this
assumption, there is a one-to-one correspondence between an agent’s value vi and his quantile
qi:
q(vi) = 1− F (vi) ∈ [0, 1] and v(qi) = F−1(1− qi).
Intuitively, the quantile denotes the probability that a random sample from F has higher
ability than agent i: thus lower quantile corresponds to higher value. Note the distribution
of quantiles is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. As it is often more convenient to work in
quantile space, we will henceforth state results using this terminology.
A direct revelation auction solicits bids b = (b1, . . . , bn) from the agents and computes an
allocation {xi(b)} and set of payments {pi(b)}. The resulting utility for agent i with quantile
qi is then
(1) ui(b; qi) = v(qi) · xi(b)− pi(b).
Optimal auction design asks what allocation and payment rules maximize the total expected
payments of the agents. Answering this question requires a prediction of agent behavior:
i.e., given a quantile and knowledge of the setting (distributions of other agents, auction
rules, etc.), how will agents map quantiles to bids? It is standard to predict that these
maps, or bidding strategies, will comprise a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the underlying
incomplete information game. A profile of bidding strategies bi(·) mapping quantiles to bids
is a BNE if each agent maximizes their utility in expectation over the quantiles of the rest of
the agents: for all qi, b
′
i:
Eq−i [ui (b(q); qi)] ≥ Eq−i
[
ui(b
′
i,b−i(q−i); qi)
]
.
This constraint gives rise to the standard characterization of BNE due to Myerson [16]
and Bulow and Roberts [4]. Letting x˜i(q) = xi(b(q)), xˆi(qi) = Eq[x˜i(q); qi] and pˆi(qi) =
Eq[pi(b(q)); qi] denote the ex-post allocation, interim allocation and payment rules respec-
tively, the lemma states:
Lemma 4 ([16], [4]). A profile of bidding functions b(·) and an implied profile of interim
allocation and payment rules xˆ(·) and pˆ(·) are a BNE only if:
• xˆi(qi) is monotone non-increasing in qi and
• pˆi(qi) = v(qi) · xˆi(qi) +
∫ 1
qi
xˆi(z) · v′(z) · dz
These two conditions are sufficient for b(·) to be a BNE if each bid function bi(·) spans the
whole region of feasible bids. Otherwise, they only imply that each player doesn’t wants to
deviate to the set of bids spanned by bi(·).
Simple manipulations of these identities allow one to characterize the revenue of a mecha-
nism concisely in terms of the quantiles of the agents. Let R(q) = q · v(q) denote the revenue
function5 of the value distribution F , and R′(qi) the virtual value of a player. Then,
5Intuitively, the revenue function computes the revenue a seller can generate by selling the (entire) item
with probability q.
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Lemma 5 ([16], [4]). The expected total payment of a mechanism is equal to the expected
virtual surplus:
Eq
[∑
i
pi(qi)
]
= Eq
[∑
i
R′(qi) · x˜i(q)
]
.
while the expected payment of each player is his expected virtual surplus allocation: Eqi [pi(qi)] =
Eqi [R
′(qi) · xˆi(qi)].
A consequence of Lemma 4, known as revenue equivalence, is that if two mechanisms
have the same interim allocation rule in BNE, they will also generate the same revenue. A
consequence of this observation and Lemma 5 is that the optimal mechanism is simply the
mechanism that maximizes the expected virtual surplus. This reduces mechanism design to
a constrained optimization problem.
A distribution F is regular if the revenue function R(q) = q · v(q), is a concave function,
or equivalently, the virtual value of a player R′(q) is non-increasing in his quantile. Our
assumption that F has support [0, v¯] also implies that R(0) = R(1) = 0. Moreover, since
virtual value R′(q) is non-increasing in quantile, this implies that the virtual value is positive
up until some quantile κ∗, and negative afterwards. Quantile κ∗, where R′(κ∗) = 0, is
defined as the monopoly quantile of the value distribution. Lemma 5 implies that the optimal
mechanism only allocates to agents with quantiles below κ∗.
5. Optimal Badge Mechanism
We will use the framework of optimal auction design to design the optimal badge mecha-
nism. To this end, it is useful to work in quantile space and (wlog) scale the utility functions
of the users by their abilities, which are just constants from the perspective of each user,
when deciding his contribution level. After doing so, the utility function of a user becomes:
(2) ui(b; qi) = v(qi) · S (ti)− bi.
Comparing with Equation (1), we see that the (virtual) ability of a user equates with the
(virtual) value of an agent in the auction literature, the status allocation of a user equates
with the item allocation and the contribution equates with the payment. The badge mech-
anism that maximizes contributions is thus functionally equivalent to the optimal (revenue-
maximizing) auction. Note our setting exhibits two key restrictions not present in standard
optimal auction design:
(1) The set of feasible allocations (status values) is highly constrained and ill-behaved
due to the externalities that a user’s status imposes on others. In particular, the total
amount of allocation, i.e.,
∑
i S (ti) is not constant as in the standard auction setting
discussed in Section 4.
(2) The payments (contributions) are not determined by the mechanism, but rather by
the users themselves. In this sense, a badge mechanism is a special type of auction,
known in the literature as an all-pay auction.
The optimal auction framework states that the optimal mechanism chooses an ex-post
allocation rule which maximizes expected virtual surplus and then computes payments which
support the implied interim allocations in equilibrium (see Section 4). Following this rea-
soning, we first compute the ex-post virtual surplus-maximizing badge allocation. We then
argue that this allocation is implemented in a BNE by a leaderboard with a contribution
cutoff. Finally, we show that the derived BNE is unique.
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5.1. Virtual Surplus-Maximizing Badge Allocation. Maximizing virtual surplus for
some instantiation of a quantile profile q is simply an optimization problem, subject to the
constraints that are implicit in the way that users derive status. The optimization problem
asks: given a vector of virtual abilities R′(q1), . . . , R′(qn), assign badges r = (r1, . . . , rn) to
the users so as to maximize:
∑
iR
′(qi)·S (ti(r)). The following lemma states that the solution
assigns to users distinct badges in decreasing order of their quantile so long as their quantile is
below the monopoly quantile κ∗ (equivalently, so long as their virtual ability is non-negative),
and assigns all other users a badge of 0. The formal proof is deferred to the appendix.
Lemma 6 (Virtual Surplus Maximizing Badge Allocation). Let q1 ≤ . . . ≤ qk ≤ κ∗ < qk+1 ≤
. . . ≤ qn be a profile of quantiles. Then the optimal virtual surplus is achieved by assigning a
distinct decreasing badge to all users {1, . . . , k} with non-negative virtual ability and badge 0,
to all negative virtual ability users {k +1, . . . , n}, i.e. r1 = n, r2 = n− 1, . . . , rk = n− k+ 1,
and rk+1 = . . . = rn = 0.
5.2. Implementation. We now show that the ex-post virtual surplus maximizing allocation
of badges is implemented at the unique equilibrium of the leaderboard with a cutoff mechanism
as defined in section 3. To do so, we need to show two things: first, we must describe the
interim status allocation rule implied by the ex-post allocation rule in Lemma 6. Then we
must compute the corresponding equilibrium contributions using the payment identity of the
optimal auction framework and check that these contributions do indeed give rise to the
interim allocation, under the rules of the aforementioned badge mechanism.
The interim status allocation of a user is the expected status value he receives from the
mechanism given his quantile qi. To compute it, let Ti be the random variable denoting the
number of opponents with quantile smaller than qi. Observe that if qi ≤ κ∗, then under the
optimal ex-post allocation of badges in Lemma 6, user i will be ranked at the Ti+1 position.
Thus the implied interim status of a user with qi ≤ κ∗ is Eq−i
[
S
(
Ti
n−1
)]
and 0 if qi > κ
∗.
Ti is distributed as a binomial distribution of n − 1 independent random trials, each with
success probability of qi.
6 For convenience, we introduce the following notation
(3) Sn (qi) =
n−1∑
ν=0
S
(
ν
n− 1
)
· βν,n−1(qi)
where βν,n(q) =
(
n−1
ν
) · qν · (1 − q)n−1−ν , denotes the Bernstein basis polynomial and Sn (q)
is the Bernstein polynomial approximation of the status function S (·). By properties of
Bernstein polynomials (see [17]), if S (·) is a strictly decreasing function then Sn (·) is also
strictly decreasing and if S (·) is convex or concave then so is Sn (·). Additionally, Sn (·) is
continuous and differentiable and Sn (0) = S (0) and Sn (1) = S (1) = 0.
Using this notation, we can express the interim status allocation for each user. This
expression will be very useful throughout the course of this paper, so we formalize it in the
following proposition.
Proposition 7. In the optimal badge mechanism, the interim status allocation of a user with
quantile qi is
(4) xˆ (qi) =
{
Sn (qi) qi ≤ κ∗
0 qi > κ
∗
6Recall that quantiles are distributed uniformly in [0, 1].
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If the interim allocation of status of a user has the form presented in Equation 4, then
for his contribution to constitute an equilibrium of the badge mechanism, it must satisfy the
payment characterization of Lemma 4:
(5) b(q) =
{
v(q) · Sn (q) +
∫ κ∗
q Sn (z) · v′(z) · dz if q ≤ κ∗
0 if q ≥ κ∗
Moreover, by Lemma 5 the expected user contribution under the optimal mechanism will be:
(6) Opt = Eq[b(q)] =
∫ κ∗
0
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq
We now show that the above pair of interim allocation and equilibrium contribution, given
in Equations (4) and (5), constitute the unique equilibrium of a badge mechanism that takes
the form of a leaderboard with a cutoff.
Theorem 8 (Optimal Badge Mechanism: Leaderboard with a cutoff). The optimal badge
mechanism assigns a distinct badge to each user in decreasing order of contribution (breaking
ties at random) as long as they pass a contribution threshold of θ = v(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗). User’s
that don’t pass the contribution threshold are assigned a badge of 0. The mechanism has a
unique equilibrium.
Proof. The proof consists of two parts: First we show that the interim allocation of status
xˆ (·), given in Equation (4) and the contribution function given in Equation (5), constitute
an equilibrium of the proposed badge mechanism. To achieve this we simply need to verify
that the implied contribution function, indeed gives rise to the optimal interim allocation
of status. Then by Lemma 4 and after also checking that users don’t want to deviate to
contributions outside of the region of contributions spanned by b(·), this pair of xˆ (·) and b(·)
are an equilibrium. Second, we need to argue that the mechanism has no other equilibria.
To achieve this, we show that this specific form of a badge mechanism, falls into the class
of anonymous order-based auctions of Chawla and Hartline [12], where it is shown that such
auctions have unique equilibria.
Observe that the contribution function in Equation (5) is strictly decreasing in the region
[0, κ∗], since b′(q) = v(q) · S′n (q), and both v(·) and Sn (·) are strictly decreasing functions.
Moreover, observe that b(κ∗) = v(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗) = θ. Since all quantiles are distributed
uniformly in [0, 1], under the above bid function, a user with quantile q ≤ κ∗ is assigned
a badge lower than every user with higher quantile and higher than every user with lower
quantile, while the event of a tie has zero measure. Thereby, the latter bid function b(·), gives
rise to the optimal interim allocation of status given in Equation (4). Last, it is easy to see
that since the user with quantile 0, doesn’t want to bid above b(0) (since he gets the same
status at a higher cost), no user wants to bid above the bid b(0). The latter follows from
the fact that the characterization in Lemma 4 guarantees that no user wants to deviate to
any contribution in the region of contributions spanned by b(·) and hence b(0). From this it
immediately follows that they also don’t want to bid above b(0). Additionally, it is also trivial
to see that no user wants to bid in the region (0, θ). Thus we can conclude that the above
pair of interim allocation and contribution function are an equilibrium of the mechanism.
The fact that the badge mechanism has a unique equilibrium, follows from the recent
results of Chawla and Hartline [12]. Despite the fact that general badge mechanisms do not
fall into the class of auctions studied in [12] (such as for instance absolute threshold badge
mechanisms studied later), the specific leaderboard with a cutoff badge mechanism falls into
their framework. To show this, we need to argue that for any contribution profile b (even in
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the case of tied contributions), the ex-post expected allocation of status of a user depends
only on his own contribution, on the number of users that have a higher contribution and
on the number of users that have the same contribution (but for instance, not on the exact
contributions of other users). Since, ties are broken uniformly at random, a user is ranked
above another user with an equal contribution with probability of 1/2. Thus if we denote
with ng(b) the number of users that contribute more and with ne(b) the number of users
with an equal contribution, then the expected ex-post status allocation of a user is:
ne(b)∑
ν=0
S
(
ng(b) + ne(b)
n− 1
)
· βν,ne(b)(1/2)
when his contribution bi ≥ θ and 0 otherwise. It is clear that this ex-post allocation only
depends on the quantities required by the framework of [12].
Graphical interpretation of optimal average and ex-post per-user contribution. To provide
more intuition of what is the average contribution of each user under the optimal badge
mechanism, we analyze the case of a linear status function S (t) = 1 − t. In this case, by
linearity of expectation, we also get that Sn (q) = 1−q. Therefore, the optimal interim status
allocation of a user is:
(7) xˆ (q) =
{
1− q q ≤ κ∗
0 q > κ∗
while his equilibrium contribution after applying integration by parts in Equation (5) is:
(8) b(q) =
{
v(κ∗)(1− κ∗) + ∫ κ∗q v(z) · dz if q ≤ κ∗
0 if q ≥ κ∗
Last, by Equation 6 and applying integration by parts, the expected contribution of each
user is:
(9) Opt = Eq [b(q)] =
∫ κ∗
0
R′(q) · (1− q) · dq = R(κ∗) · (1− κ∗) +
∫ κ∗
0
R(q)dq
In this case, the expected user contribution has a nice pictorial representation, if we plot the
revenue function of the ability distribution, as is depicted in Figure 1.
Drawbacks of optimal badge mechanism. The optimal badge mechanism described above has
two main drawbacks. First the equilibrium contribution is a very complex function of the
ability distribution, and therefore, small errors in a user’s beliefs will dramatically change
the total contribution that would arise in practice. Second, the optimal mechanism is not
detail-free, as it depends on the monopoly quantile of the distribution. In the sections that
follow we will address each of these issues separately and we will give approximately optimal
badge mechanisms that avoid some of these drawbacks.
6. Absolute Threshold Mechanisms
In this section, we explore the approximate optimality of absolute threshold mechanisms
as formally described in Definition 1. We show that for concave status valuations (includ-
ing linear), the expected user contribution of a mechanism with a single threshold is a 4-
approximation to the expected user contribution generated by the optimal mechanism. This
threshold is set such that any user with ability greater than the median ability will earn the
top badge while the other half of the population will not contribute anything. Furthermore,
an absolute threshold mechanism with a slightly more complex contribution threshold, which
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(a) Optimal Mechanism
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Κ Κ
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(b) Absolute Threshold Mechanism
Figure 1. These figures plot the revenue curves as a function of quantile
when the distribution of abilities is given by the CDF F (v) = v2 (equivalently
v(q) =
√
1− q). When status is linear, the expected user contribution of the
optimal mechanism is given by the shaded area in the left figure. The expected
user contribution of an absolute threshold mechanism with a single threshold,
as discussed in section 6 is given by the shaded area in the figure on the right.
intuitively takes into account the dispersion of the ability distribution, is a 2-approximation
for linear status and a 3-approximation for strictly concave status. By way of example, we
show that no mechanism with a single threshold can do better than a 2-approximation. When
status valuations are convex, no absolute threshold mechanism with a constant number of
thresholds can achieve any finite approximation and thus the designer must add more thresh-
olds as the number of users grows in order to achieve a good approximation. However, on
the positive side, we show that the number of thresholds grows quite slowly with the number
of users, indicating that absolute mechanisms with a “small” number of thresholds can be
approximately optimal.
We begin our analysis by characterizing the unique symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium7
of an absolute threshold mechanism with thresholds θ. This equilibrium is monotone, non-
increasing in each user’s quantile. A lower quantile implies a higher ability, so higher ability
users will contribute more than lower ability users in equilibrium.
Theorem 9 (Equilibrium Structure). Any absolute threshold mechanism with contribution
thresholds θ = (θ1, . . . , θm) has a unique symmetric BNE b(·) characterized by a vector of
quantile thresholds κ = (κ1, . . . , κm) with κ1 ≥ κ2... ≥ κm such that a user with ability
quantile qi will make a contribution of:
b(qi) =


0 qi > κ1
θt qi ∈ (κt+1, κt]
θm qi ≤ κm
These quantile thresholds can be computed by a system of m equations.
7We note that asymmetric equilibria do exist in absolute threshold badge mechanisms.
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Furthermore, for any vector of quantile thresholds κ = (κ1, . . . , κm) there exists a vector
of contribution thresholds θ, characterized by:
∀t ∈ [1, . . . ,m] : θt =
t∑
j=1
v(κj) · (Sn (κj)− Sn (κj−1)) ,(10)
under which the unique symmetric BNE implements κ.
In the unique symmetric BNE, a vector of contribution thresholds gives rise to a vector of
quantile thresholds. The main implication of this theorem is that we can design mechanisms
over quantile thresholds and know that there exists a vector of contribution thresholds that
implement the desired quantile thresholds. This greatly simplifies the problem of optimal
design because we no longer need to worry about the induced equilibrium behavior. For the
remainder of this section, we focus on designing badge mechanisms in quantile space rather
than contribution space.
6.1. Expected Contributions of a Single Threshold Mechanism. We now analyze the
approximate optimality of absolute threshold mechanisms that use a single threshold. We
start by deriving the expected user contribution generated by any such badge mechanism
and then prove that, if the threshold is set appropriately, then it is a good approximation to
the expected contribution under the optimal mechanism, for any concave status function.
Let θ be the contribution threshold and let κ be the corresponding equilibrium quantile
threshold. There are only two rational contributions in equilibrium, bi = θ or bi = 0. At
equilibrium all users with quantile smaller than κ will contribute θ and get the top badge.
Hence, the interim status allocation of a player who gets the top badge is Sn (κ). Any user
with quantile qi = κ must be indifferent between contributing θ and earning the top badge,
or contributing 0 and earning badge 0. Thus κ and θ must satisfy the following relationship:
θ = v(κ) · Sn (κ)
Then the expected contribution of a user is equal to the probability that she has a quantile
qi ≤ κ, times θ.
(11) Apx = E[bi] = κ · θ = κ · v(κ) · Sn (κ) = R(κ) · Sn (κ)
This gives a simple expression for the expected user contribution of a single threshold
mechanism as a function of the quantile threshold implemented in equilibrium. In the case
of linear status, the expected user contribution is graphically represented in right plot in
Figure 1. This representation serves as an intuition for the upper and lower bounds on
approximations achievable by single absolute threshold mechanisms.
Theorem 10 (Median Absolute Badge Mechanism). When the status function S (·) is con-
cave, the expected total contribution of an absolute threshold mechanism with a single quantile
threshold κ = 12 is a 4-approximation to the expected total contribution of the optimal badge
mechanism.
This suggests that designers can implement a good incentive mechanism by setting the
threshold of a single badge such that half of the user base earns the badge.The next theorem
shows that this approximation can be improved by incorporating the monopoly quantile of
the ability distribution κ∗. In the Appendix we show that the bound of 4 for the median
badge mechanism is tight. Hence, incorporating the monopoly quantile is essential in getting
better approximation guarantees.
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Theorem 11. When the status value function S (·) is concave, the expected total contribution
of an absolute threshold mechanism with a single quantile threshold κ = min{κ∗, 1/2} is a
3-approximation to the expected total contribution of the optimal badge mechanism. Further-
more, when the status value function is linear, it is a 2-approximation.
Lower Bounds. We now explore the limitations of absolute threshold mechanisms with a
single threshold. Example 6.1 shows that no absolute threshold mechanism with a single
threshold can yield better than a 2-approximation to the optimal mechanism even when the
status valuation is linear. Example 6.1 shows that for the class of convex status functions,
no absolute threshold mechanism with even a constant number of thresholds can achieve a
constant approximation to the optimal mechanism.
Example. [Tight lower bound for any single absolute threshold]
OPT
Κ
*12 1
q
RH12L
RHqL
APX
Κ
*12 1
q
RH12L
RHqL
Figure 2. Left figure depicts the per user contribution of the optimal badge
mechanism, when the ability distribution is of the form F (v) = vα. Observe
that the rectangle with height R(1/2) is at least as large as the area below
the concave curve, since the curve lies below the tangent at 1/2. The per user
contribution of a single absolute badge at κ = 1/2 is depicted on the right
and is half of the latter rectangle. As α → ∞, the left area converges to a
triangle, and no single badge can achieve more than a half approximation.
Let the status value function be S (t) = 1−t. Figure 2 shows an example of a revenue curve
for some distribution with cumulative density F . The figure on the left shows the expected
user contribution for the optimal mechanism while the right figure shows the expected user
contribution for an absolute threshold mechanism with a single threshold. We will construct
a distribution F such that the area under the curve on the left converges to a “triangle” while
the expected contribution of the single threshold mechanism will be the “rectangle” on the
right. Any rectangle inscribed inside of this triangle will have at most half of the area of the
triangle.
Suppose that the ability distribution has cumulative density function F (v) = vα and
support [0, 1], as α→∞. The ability as a function of the quantile is then v(q) = F−1(1−q) =
(1− q)1/α. Recall that the revenue function is R(q) = q · v(q), so in this case
lim
α→∞R(q) = q
All players have positive virtual ability (since R′(q) ≥ 0 for all q), so the expected user
contribution of the optimal mechanism converges to Opt =
∫ 1
0 q ·dq = 12 . On the other hand,
the expected user contribution of any single absolute badge mechanism is Apx = κ ·(1−κ) ≤
1
4 .
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Intuitively, the single threshold mechanism has the following limitation. If the quantile
threshold is set low, then only high ability users will earn the top badge and the mechanism
loses many contributions because a large fraction of users contribute nothing. If the quantile
threshold is set high, then a large fraction of users will earn the top badge but the status
value of the badge decreases and thus the amount that users are willing to contribute to earn
it decreases. The optimal mechanism does not have this drawback. At a high level, a single
badge threshold, unlike a complete ranking, is not effective in motivating a population of
users with almost identical abilities.
We now turn to the case of convex status functions and show that the concavity assump-
tion a necessity for single absolute threshold mechanisms. Specifically, we give an example
where no absolute threshold threshold mechanism with a constant number of thresholds can
achieve any constant approximation to the optimal badge mechanism. Instead, the number
of thresholds needed to achieve a constant approximation grows logarithmically with number
of participants.
Example. [Logarithmic loss for convex status] Consider a convex status function where
the status of a user is inversely proportional to the proportion of users (including the user
himself) with a weakly better status class (normalized so that S (1) = 0):
(12) S (t) =
n
(n− 1)t+ 1 − 1
Assume that abilities are distributed uniformly in [0, 1]. The ability function is then
v(q) = 1− q and the revenue function is R(q) = q(1− q), with derivative R′(q) = 1−2 · q and
the monopoly quantile is 1/2. The interim status allocation of a user with quantile q under
the optimal mechanism ends up being after simplifications Sn (q) =
1−(1−q)n
q − 1. Thereby
the optimal expected user contribution is:
Opt =
∫ 1/2
0
(1− 2 · q)Sn (q) dq =
∫ 1/2
0
(1− 2 · q)1− (1− q)
n
q
dq − 1
2
∫ 1/2
0
(1− 2 · q)dq
≥
∫ 1/2
0
(1− 2q)1− e
−nq
q
dq − 1
8
= Θ(log(n))
On the other hand we note that the virtual surplus, and hence total contribution, achievable
by any mechanism that usesm badges is at most n·(m−1). Even if all users have a maximum
virtual ability of 1, the virtual surplus from any badge mechanism with m badges at any
contribution profile b is simply:
m∑
t=1
|i : r(bi,b−i) = t|
(
n
|i : r(bi,b−i) ≥ t| − 1
)
≤
m∑
t=1
n−
m∑
t=1
|i : r(bi,b−i) = t| = n ·m− n
Thus as n → ∞ the approximation to the optimal total contribution achievable with m
badges grows as O
(
log(n)
m−1
)
.
The previous examples show the limitations of absolute threshold mechanisms with a single
threshold. In section A.3 in the appendix, we show how these lower bound examples can be
circumvented by using more than one threshold for concave status functions and by using
more than a constant, but still small, number of badges for convex status.
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7. Approximation with Leaderboards
In this section we explore the approximation power of the leaderboard mechanism. Recall
that the leaderboard mechanism, as defined in section 3, assigns each user a unique badge
based only on the rank of his contribution bi within the entire vector of contribution b. We
prove that the leaderboard mechanism is a good approximation to the optimal mechanism
when the status function is convex. In contrast, for concave status functions the leaderboard
mechanism may be an unboundedly bad approximation.8
Theorem 12. For any convex status function, the leaderboard mechanism is a 2-approximation
to the optimal mechanism.
On the other hand the following example shows that for concave status functions, the
total contribution achieved by the leaderboard mechanism, can be arbitrarily worse than the
optimal total contribution. This demonstrates the necessity of having some sort of cut-off,
below which all agents are assigned the zero badge.
Example. Consider the concave status function of S(t) = (1 − t)α with a uniform [0, 1]
distribution of abilities, i.e., F (x) = x. We consider α → 0 such that the status function is
an almost constant function. Intuitively, this means that a player is very easily satisfied by
being simply ranked above a small portion of the population and any other portion yields
almost no extra status value. We also consider the number of players n→∞ implying that
Sn (q)→ (1− q)α. In this setting, the revenue function R(q) = q · F−1(1− q) = q(1− q) and
the expected per-player contribution of the leaderboard mechanism converges to 0:
lim
α→0
lim
n→∞Apx = limα→0
∫ 1
0
R′(q) · lim
n→∞Sn (q) dq = limα→0
∫ 1
0
(1− 2 · q) · (1− q)αdq
= lim
α→0
α
α2 + 3α + 2
→ 0
where the interchange of the limit and the integration is justified by the uniform conver-
gence of Bernstein polynomials. On the other hand the optimal mechanism is a leaderboard
with contribution threshold of κ∗ = 1/2 yielding an expected per-player contribution which
converges to a constant of 1/4:
lim
α→0
lim
n→∞Opt = limα→0
∫ 1/2
0
R′(q) · lim
n→∞Sn (q) dq = limα→0
∫ 1/2
0
(1− 2 · q) · (1− q)αdq
= lim
α→0
α+ 2−α−1
α2 + 3α+ 2
→ 1
4
.
8. Robustness to Treatment of Equal Status Opponents
Implicit in our utility model so far is that users treat people in the same class as them,
as if they were losing to them, since equally ranked opponents affect a user’s utility in an
equal manner as opponents ranked strictly higher. How do our results change qualitatively
if instead users treated ties differently? We show that for the case of linear status, our main
approximation results carry over irrespective of the way that people treat ties. Specifically,
8An alternative way of bypassing this high inefficiency, is instead of ranking all players, simply rank a top
percentile. By setting the top percentile to approximate the monopoly quantile, then intuitively as the number
of players grows large, the interim allocation of this mechanism, converges to that of a leaderboard with a
cutoff. In this section we focus on the completely prior-free mechanism of ranking everyone.
SOCIAL STATUS AND BADGE DESIGN 17
we show that the median badge mechanism is a 4-approximation, for any tie-breaking rule
and in fact is implemented at equilibrium by the same contribution threshold. Moreover, the
prior-free leaderboard mechanism, is always a 2-approximation to the optimal mechanism.
We view this as an extra robustness property of our simple vs optimal results.
More formally, let te be the proportion of opponents that have the same status class as
user i and tg the proportion that have strictly higher status class. Then the status value of
a user is simply:
(13) S(te, tg) = 1− te − β · tg
where β ∈ [0, 1]. Intuitively, β can be seen as the probability of losing against an equally high
opponent. Our initial model corresponds to the case of β = 1. Other than that, the utility of
a user is the same as defined in Section 3, i.e. if tie(b), t
i
g(b) is the corresponding proportions
for user i under a bid profile b, then:
(14) ui(b; qi) = S(t
i
e(b), t
i
g(b))−
bi
v(qi)
Interpretation of tie-breaking probability in Q&A forums. The linear status model with
arbitrary tie-breaking probability is rather meaningful in the context of Q&A forum where
status can be interpreted as argumentative power. We can think of status utility as the
probability that a user wins in an argument against a random other user from the system.
In most such systems, the credibility derived from having a badge plays a quintessential role
in deciding who wins the argument (e.g. voted best answer, presented at the top of the
page). Our status utility assumes that a user with a strictly higher badge status will win
an argument. Additionally, the tie-breaking rule in the status utility function corresponds
to the probability that a user wins against an opponent with equal status. Our model so far
assumed that in such battles, even if there is a winner, his victory is Pyrrhic, and no user
ends up getting any utility. The alternative model corresponds to each user winning with
some probability or equivalently deriving lower utility when winning.
Single absolute threshold approximation. We first show that the median badge mechanism
(i.e. an absolute threshold mechanism such that at equilibrium half of the population gets
the high badge), achieves a 4 approximation to the contribution of the optimal mechanism
irrespective of the value of β and the median mechanism is implemented by setting a contri-
bution threshold of v(1/2)2 , again irrespective of β. We point out that the optimal mechanism
changes as β varies. We explore the structure of the optimal mechanism in the Appendix
(Section A.5), where we point that for any value of β other than 0, 1/2, and 1, the optimal
mechanism has a very complex structure and doesn’t correspond for instance to some ranking
mechanism.
Theorem 13. For any β ∈ [0, 1], the median badge mechanism achieves a 4 approximation
to the contribution of the optimal mechanism. The median badge mechanism is implemented
at the unique symmetric monotone equilibrium of the absolute threshold mechanism defined
by a contribution threshold of v(1/2)2 , when β ≥ 1/2 and at some equilibrium for β < 1/2.
Approximation with leaderboards. Despite the complex structure of the optimal mechanism
for arbitrary β, we show that for any such β, the mechanism that complete ranks all users
in decreasing order of contribution (breaking ties uniformly at random), always achieves a
2-approximation to the optimal direct mechanism at the unique equilibrium.
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Theorem 14. For any β ∈ [0, 1], the badge mechanism that assigns a distinct badge to each
user in decreasing order of contribution, is always a 2-approximation to the total contribution
of the optimal mechanism.
Structure of optimal mechanism. Observe that the structure of the optimal mechanism
changes as the tie-breaking rule varies. Specifically, Lemma 6 that characterizes the virtual
surplus maximizing allocation of badges is no longer valid if β 6= 1. By the equivalence of
revenue maximization and virtual surplus maximization discussed in Section 5, to characterize
the optimal mechanism it suffices to characterize the virtual surplus maximizing allocation.
In this Appendix, we show that the virtual surplus maximizing allocation implies a nice
structure of the optimal mechanism only for the case of β = 0, 1/2 or 1, and for other values
of β, the ex-post virtual surplus maximizing allocation is a complex function of the specific
instantiation of player quantiles. This complexity of the optimal badge mechanism, render
the extension of our approximate results in the section, even more compelling.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the design of badge mechanisms when the valuation for a badge
is driven by its ability to impart social status to its owners. The shape of the status value
functions dictates the necessary features of any good mechanism. When the status valuations
are concave, it is necessary to use coarse partitions and group all the low ability users into
the same badge. Under convexity, is is necessary to use fine portioning and separate the high
ability users into their own badges.
This paper is a first step towards combining the game-theoretic study of virtual incentive
mechanisms to more realistic utility models. The next step in this agenda is to incorporate a
“warm glow” component, that is the implicit value users get from contributing content, into
the utility function, and to understand how this modification influences the design of optimal
incentive mechanisms.
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Appendix A. Appendix
A.1. Proofs from Section 5. LEMMA 6 Let q1 ≤ . . . ≤ qk ≤ κ∗ < qk+1 ≤ . . . ≤ qn be
a profile of quantiles. Then the optimal virtual surplus is achieved by assigning a distinct
decreasing badge to all users {1, . . . , k} with non-negative virtual ability and badge 0, to all
negative virtual ability users {k + 1, . . . , n}, i.e. r1 = n, r2 = n − 1, . . . , rk = n− k + 1, and
rk+1 = . . . = rn = 0.
Proof of Lemma 6 : The statement follows by the following arguments: first it is easy
to see that the allocation of badges should be monotone non-decreasing in the virtual abil-
ity or equivalently non-increasing in quantile, since if R′(qi) > R′(qj) (i.e. qi < qj) and
ri < rj then we can increase virtual welfare by swapping the status class of player i and
player j (this wouldn’t affect the status allocation of the remaining players). Therefore, it
holds that r1 ≥ r2 ≥ . . . ,≥ rn and it remains to show that r1 > . . . > rk > 0 and that
rk+1 = . . . = rn = 0.
If for some i < k it holds that ri = ri+1 = . . . = ri+t, then by discriminating player i above
the remaining players, will increase virtual welfare. More concretely, by setting r′j = rj − 1
for all j > i (for a moment let’s allow for negative badges, since at the end we can always
shift the badge numbers), then the satisfaction of all players j > i doesn’t change since the
number of people that have badge at least as high as them remains the same. Additionally,
the status allocation of player i strictly increases, since the number of people ranked at least
as high as him, strictly decreased. A recursive application of this reasoning implies that
r1 > . . . > rk > rk+1 ≥ . . . ≥ rn.
Now we show that it must be that rk+1 = . . . = rn. By such a grouping, the status
allocation of all negative virtual ability players is 0, and therefore their negative virtual ability
is not accounted in the virtual welfare. Moreover, by grouping together negative virtual ability
players, the status allocation of all non-negative virtual ability players is unaffected.
A.2. Proofs from Section 6. THEOREM 9 Any absolute threshold mechanism with
contribution thresholds θ = (θ1, . . . , θm) has a unique symmetric BNE b(·) characterized by
a vector of quantile thresholds κ = (κ1, . . . , κm) with κ1 ≥ κ2... ≥ κm such that a user with
ability quantile qi will make a contribution of:
b(qi) =


0 qi > κ1
θt qi ∈ (κt+1, κt]
θm qi ≤ κm
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These quantile thresholds can be computed by a system of m equations.
Furthermore, for any vector of quantile thresholds κ = (κ1, . . . , κm) there exists a vector
of contribution thresholds θ, characterized by:
∀t ∈ [1, . . . ,m] : θt =
t∑
j=1
v(κj) · (Sn (κj)− Sn (κj−1)) ,(15)
under which the unique symmetric BNE implements κ.
Proof of Theorem 9 : We start by observing that if a player gets status class ri, her output
should be exactly the threshold to win that badge, θri , because producing more output would
cost more effort and would not increase her value. Additionally, it is easy to see that the
equilibrium mapping would be monotone in quantile, i.e. if q1 > q2 then b(q1) ≤ b(q2). In
other words if a player with quantile q1 bids θr1 and with value q2 < q1 he bids θr2 then it
must be that r1 ≤ r2. 9
Since the equilibrium mapping is a monotone step function of quantile, it is defined by a
set of thresholds in the quantile space κ1, . . . , κp, for some p ≤ m, such that if player i has
quantile qi ∈ (κt+1, κt] then he produces output b(qi) = θt. If qi > κ1 then b(qi) = 0 and if
qi ≤ κp then b(qi) = θp. For notational convenience we will denote with κ0 = 1 and κp+1 = 0.
Observe that it is not necessarily true that p = m, since some contribution thresholds might
be too high.
To characterize the BNE, it remains to compute those quantile thresholds and show that
they are unique. A player’s status value is a function of the proportion of other players with
a weakly better badge. A player with quantile qi ∈ [κt+1, κt] earns the badge associated with
quantile κt; thus, because the equilibrium is a monotone step function, any player that has a
quantile less than κt will earn a weakly better badge than player i. By definition, a player has
a lower quantile than κt with probability κt. This allows us to compute the interim status
value of player i with quantile qi ∈ [κt+1, κt] as:
(16) xˆ (qi) = Sn (κt)
where Sn (·) is given by Equation (3).
By the payment identity of Lemma 4, for the vector of quantiles κ to be an equilibrium
they must satisfy the following equation:
∀t ∈ [1, . . . , p] : θt =
t∑
j=1
v(κj) · (Sn (κj)− Sn (κj−1))(17)
This relationship is depicted in Figure 3. Equivalently, the above set of conditions can be
re-written as:
∀t ∈ [1, . . . , p] : v(κt) · (Sn (κt)− Sn (κt−1)) = θt − θt−1(18)
This set of equalities has an intuitive interpretation as saying that the players with quantiles
at the boundary of two badges should be indifferent between getting either of the two badges.
Additionally, to ensure that the latter is an equilibrium we also need to make sure that if
9Suppose the contrary. For simplicity, denote with xr the expected status that a player gets from bidding
θr, assuming the rest of the players follow strategy b(·). Since, r1 > r2 we have θr1 > θr2 . Since b(q1) is an
equilibrium for a player with value q1, it must be that v(q1)(xr1 − xr2) ≥ θr1 − θr2 > 0. Thus xr1 > xr2
and since v(q2) > v(q1) we get: v(q2)(xr1 − xr2) > v(q1)(xr1 − xr2) ≥ θr1 − θr2 . But the latter implies,
v(q2) · xr1 − θr1 > v(q2) · xr2 − θr2 and therefore b(v2) cannot be an equilibrium for a player with quantile q2.
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Figure 3. Equilibrium bid function (left) and relation between interim status
allocation and contribution thresholds at equilibrium (right).
p < m, then the highest ability player doesn’t prefer being on badge p+1 alone, rather than
being on badge p:
if p < m : v(0) · (Sn (0)− Sn (κp)) ≤ θp+1 − θp(19)
To show uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium we simply need to show that the above set
of conditions have a unique solution.
Lemma 15. There exists a unique p ≤ m and a unique vector κ = (κ1, . . . , κp), that satisfies
the system of Equations (18) and (19).
Proof. Given a profile of badge thresholds θ, we show recursively that there is a unique set
of quantile thresholds which satisfies the set of equations. For t = 1, Equation (18) becomes:
θ1 = v(κ1) · Sn (κ1). Observe that v(0) · Sn (0) = v¯ · S (0), v(1) · Sn (1) = 0, v(x) · Sn (x)
is continuous decreasing. If θ1 < v¯ · S (0) then a unique solution exists (recall that v¯ is the
upper bound of the ability distribution). Otherwise, no player is willing to bid as high as θ1
(or any θt for t > 1) and the recursion stops with p = 0. Subsequently, find the solution a2
to the equation: θ2 − θ1 = v(κ2)(Sn (κ2)− Sn (κ1)). For similar reason, either a unique such
solution exists or no player (not even a player with ability v¯) is willing to bid θ2 rather than
bid θ1 and we can stop the recursion, setting p = 1. Then solve for κ3, . . . , κp in the same
way.
The latter Lemma completes the proof of the uniqueness and characterization of the equi-
librium. The inverse part of the theorem, is trivial based on the previous discussion.
THEOREM 10. When the status function S (·) is concave, the expected total con-
tribution of an absolute threshold mechanism with a single quantile threshold κ = 12 is a
4-approximation to the expected total contribution of the optimal badge mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 10 : Setting a quantile threshold of κ = 1/2, by Equation (11), yields an
expected user contribution of
Apx = R
(
1
2
)
· Sn
(
1
2
)
.
Our first step is to upper bound the expected user contribution of the optimal mechanism, and
then to show that R(1/2) ·Sn (1/2) is a 4-approximation of this upper bound. By symmetry,
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an approximation of the expected user contribution, implies the same approximation to the
expected total contribution.
By Equation 6 and using the fact that Sn (q) ≤ Sn (0) and that R′(q) ≥ 0 for any q ≤ κ∗:
Opt =
∫ κ∗
0
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq ≤ Sn (0)
∫ κ∗
0
R′(q)dq ≤ Sn (0) ·R(κ∗)
Now we prove R
(
1
2
) · Sn (12) ≥ 14R(κ∗) · Sn (0). By the concavity of Sn (·) and the fact that
Sn (1) = 0, we get
Sn
(
1
2
)
≥ 1
2
Sn (0) +
1
2
Sn (1) =
1
2
Sn (0)
From the concavity of the revenue function R(·) and Jensen’s inequality, we get
R
(
1
2
)
≥
∫ 1
0
R(q)dq ≥ 1
2
R(κ∗)
where the first inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality and the last inequality follows from
concavity and the fact that R(0) = R(1) = 0 and R(κ∗) is the maximum. 10 Putting this all
together
Apx = R
(
1
2
)
· Sn
(
1
2
)
≥ 1
4
R(κ∗) · Sn (0) ≥ 1
4
Opt
THEOREM 11 When the status value function S (·) is concave, the expected total contri-
bution of an absolute threshold mechanism with a single quantile threshold κ = min{κ∗, 1/2}
is a 3-approximation to the expected total contribution of the optimal badge mechanism. Fur-
thermore, when the status value function is linear, it is a 2-approximation.
Proof of Theorem 11 : Throughout the proof we will denote with Opt the expected user
contribution of the optimal mechanism and with Apx the expected user contribution of the
single absolute badge mechanism with quantile threshold κ = min{κ∗, 1/2}. We remind that
Opt and Apx are characterized by Equations (6) and (11) respectively.
Linear Case. We begin by proving the case where the status value function S (·) is linear.
If κ∗ ≤ 1/2, then κ = κ∗ and:
Opt =
∫ κ∗
0
R′(q) · (1− q)dq ≤ R(κ∗) ≤ R(κ∗) · 2 · (1− κ∗) = 2 ·Apx.
If κ∗ > 1/2, then κ = 1/2. Consider the concave curve defined as
Rˆ(q) =
{
R(q) q ∈ [0, κ∗)
R(κ∗) q ∈ [κ∗, 1]
By Equation (6), observe that Opt =
∫ 1
0 Rˆ(q)dq. By concavity of Rˆ(q) and applying Jensen’s
inequality we get that:
(20)
∫ 1
0
Rˆ(q)dq ≤ Rˆ
(
1
2
)
= R
(
1
2
)
10The latter is the same property of regular distributions employed for proving Bulow-Klemperer’s result
that the revenue of the optimal single item auction with one bidder yields at most the revenue of a second
price auction with two i.i.d bidders. See Figure 1 of [6] or Figure 5.1 in [12]
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where in the last equality we used the fact that κ∗ > 1/2 and thereby Rˆ(1/2) = R(1/2).
Thus we get that: Opt ≤ R(1/2). A single badge mechanism with quantile threshold at 1/2
gets revenue Apx = 12R(1/2) ≥ 12Opt.
Thus a single badge mechanism with quantile κ = min{κ∗, 1/2} yields a 2-approximation
to the total contribution of the optimal mechanism in any case.
Concave Case. We now consider the case where the status value function S (·) is concave.
If κ∗ ≤ 1/2, then κ = κ∗. By the concavity of Sn (·) and the fact that Sn (1) = 0:
Sn (κ
∗) ≥ (1− κ∗) · Sn (0) ≥ 12Sn (0). Thus:
Apx = R(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗) ≥ R(κ∗) · 1
2
· Sn (0) ≥ 1
2
Opt.
The fact that Opt ≤ R(κ∗) · Sn (0), comes from the simple fact that Sn (q) ≤ Sn (0) and by
replacing it in Equation (6).
If κ∗ > 1/2 then κ = 1/2. We will use the following simple facts:
(1) Since R(q) is increasing concave for any q ∈ [0, κ∗] and R(0) = 0, then for any
t ∈ [1/2, κ∗] : R′(t) ≤ R′(1/2) ≤ R(1/2)
1/2
= 2 · R(1/2),
(2) Since Sn (q) is a decreasing concave function and Sn (1) = 0, then for any
t ∈ [0, 1/2] : −S′n (t) ≤ −S′n (1/2) ≤
Sn (1/2)
1− 1/2 = 2 · Sn (1/2) .
Using these properties and an application of integration by parts, we can upper bound the
expected user contribution of the optimal badge mechanism:
Opt =
∫ κ∗
0
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq =
∫ 1/2
0
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq +
∫ κ∗
1/2
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq
= R
(
1
2
)
· Sn
(
1
2
)
+
∫ 1/2
0
R(q) · (−S′n (q))dq +
∫ κ∗
1/2
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq
≤ R
(
1
2
)
· Sn
(
1
2
)
+ 2 · Sn
(
1
2
)
·
∫ 1/2
0
R(q)dq + 2 · R
(
1
2
)
·
∫ κ∗
1/2
Sn (q) dq
≤ R
(
1
2
)
· Sn
(
1
2
)
+ 2 · Sn
(
1
2
)
·
∫ 1/2
0
R
(
1
2
)
dq + 2 ·R
(
1
2
)
·
∫ κ∗
1/2
Sn
(
1
2
)
dq
≤ 3 · R
(
1
2
)
· Sn
(
1
2
)
= 3 ·Apx
Therefore, in any case, setting κ = min{1/2, κ∗}, yields a 3-approximation to the optimal
revenue.
Example. [Tight lower bound for median badge mechanism] Let the status value function
be S (t) = 1− t. We will show that when the distribution of abilities has a long tail then the
median badge mechanism is at most a 4-approximation to the optimal badge mechanism. In
this example, only the top ability make significant contributions in the optimal mechanism.
The median badge mechanism sets too low of a contribution threshold to achieve a better
approximation.
Specifically, suppose that the distribution of abilities has a cumulative density function of
F (v) =
H + 1
H
v
v + 1
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and support [0,H], and consider the limit as H →∞.11. The revenue function R(q) of such
an ability distribution is
(21) R(q) = q · v(q) = q · F−1(1− q) = q 1− q1
H + q
H→∞→ 1− q.
The corresponding monopoly quantile is κ∗ =
√
1+H−1
H → 0 as H →∞, and so, by Equation
(9), the expected user contribution in the optimal mechanism is (1−κ∗)R(κ∗)+∫ κ∗0 R(q)dq →
1, whereas in the median badge mechanism, by Equation (11), it is (1− 1/2)R(1/2) → 1/4.
Graphically, our example corresponds to the case where the revenue curve converges to
a ”left triangle”, of the form R(q) = 1 − q. In that case, the expected user contribution
of the optimal badge mechanism corresponds to the rectangle of height and length 1, while
of the median badge mechanism corresponds to the rectangle of height and length 1/2 (see
Figure 4).
OPT
Κ
* 12 1
q
RH12L
1
RHqL
APX
Κ
* 12 1
q
RH12L
RHqL
Figure 4. Contributions of the optimal and median badge mechanism for
ability distributions of the form F (v) = H+1H
v
v+1 , respectively.
A.3. Approximation with Many Absolute Badges. The examples from section 6.1
demonstrate the limitations of mechanisms that use a single threshold. With a single thresh-
old, no mechanism can achieve better than a 2-approximation for concave or linear status.
Furthermore, no finite approximation is possible for convex status valuations with any con-
stant number of thresholds. We now characterize the approximate optimality of mechanisms
with m > 1 thresholds. For concave status, the contributions generated by badge mechanism
with m badges quickly approaches the contributions of the optimal mechanism.
Theorem 16. If the social status function S (·) is concave, then a badge mechanism with m
badges, can achieve a mm−2-approximation to the total contribution of the optimal mechanism.
Proof. Throughout the proof we will denote with Opt the expected user contribution of the
optimal mechanism and with Apx the expected user contribution of an absolute threshold
mechanism characterized by a vector of quantile thresholds κ = (κ1, . . . , κm). We remind
that Opt is given by Equation (6) and will first provide a characterization of Apx as a
function of the quantile threshold vector.
11In this limit, the distribution of abilities converges to a translation of what is called the equal revenue
distribution.
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Observe that by the form of the equilibrium described in Theorem 9, we get that the
interim status allocation of a player in the absolute threshold mechanism is:
xˆ (q) =


0 q > κ1
Sn (κt) q ∈ (κt+1, κt]
Sn (κm) q ≤ κm
Thus by applying the generic expected user contribution characterization of Lemma 5, we
get:
(22) Apx =
∫ 1
0
R′(q) · xˆ (q) dq = R(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗) +
m∑
t=2
R(κt)(Sn (κt)− Sn (κt−1))
Consider the badge mechanism with quantile thresholds defined so that they satisfy the
following conditions:
κ1 = κ
∗
∀t = {2, . . . ,m} : Sn (κt) = Sn (κ∗) + (t− 1) ·∆x,
where
∆x =
Sn (0)− Sn (κ∗)
m
.
This implies that: Sn (κt) − Sn (κt−1) = ∆x for any t ∈ [2,m] and Sn (0) − Sn (κm) = ∆x.
For convenience we will denote with κm+1 = 0 and κ0 = 1.
By Equation (22), the expected user contribution of the above absolute threshold mecha-
nism is:
Apx = R(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗) +
m∑
t=2
R(κt)(Sn (κt)− Sn (κt−1)) = R(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗) +
m∑
t=2
R(κt) ·∆x
On the other hand the expected user contribution of the optimal mechanism can be lower
bounded by applying integration by parts to Equation (6) and using the monotonicity of the
revenue function in the region [0, κ∗]:
Opt =
∫ κ∗
0
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq = R(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗)−
∫ κ∗
0
R(q)S′n (q) dq
= R(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗)−
m∑
t=1
∫ κt
κt+1
R(q) · S′n (q) dq
≤ R(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗)−
m∑
t=1
R(κt)
∫ κt
κt+1
S′n (q) dq = R(κ
∗) · Sn (κ∗) +
m∑
t=1
R(κt) ·∆x
Thus we get that:
(23) Opt−Apx ≤ R(κ∗) ·∆x = R(κ∗) · Sn (0)− Sn (κ
∗)
m
≤ R(κ∗) · Sn (0)
m
We will now show that Opt ≥ 12R(κ∗) · Sn (0). Since, the revenue function R(q) is concave
and R(0) = 0, for any
q ∈ [0, κ∗] : R(q) ≥ R(κ
∗)
κ∗
q.
26 NICOLE IMMORLICA, GREG STODDARD, AND VASILIS SYRGKANIS
Thus:
Opt = R(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗)−
∫ κ∗
0
R(q) · S′n (q) dq ≥ R(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗)−
R(κ∗)
κ∗
∫ κ∗
0
q · S′n (q) dq
= R(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗)− R(κ
∗)
κ∗
(
κ∗ · Sn (κ∗)−
∫ κ∗
0
Sn (q) dq
)
=
R(κ∗)
κ∗
∫ κ∗
0
Sn (q) dq
Since, Sn (q) is a non-negative concave decreasing function, we have that:
(24)
∫ κ∗
0
Sn (q) dq ≥ Sn (0) + Sn (κ
∗)
2
κ∗ ≥ Sn (0)
2
κ∗
Thus we get:
(25) Opt ≥ 1
2
· R(κ∗) · Sn (0)
Combining Equations (23) and (25):
(26) Opt−Apx ≤ 2
m
Opt
which yields the theorem.
For convex valuations, we show that a 4-approximation is possible if the mechanism uses
a number of thresholds that is logarithmic in a natural parameter of the status valuation
function: H = S(0)
S( 12)
, i.e. the ratio of the status value of the highest ranked user to the status
value of a median-ranked user. The next theorem shows that log(H) badges are sufficient
for achieving a constant approximation. For a large class of natural status valuations, this
ratio H will be on the order O(n), the number of users. For example, if we use the status
value function S (t) = n(n−1)t+1 − 1 from example 6.1, then S (0) = n − 1 and S
(
1
2
)
= n−1n+1
and hence a badge mechanism with log(H) = log(n+1) thresholds yields a 4-approximation
to the optimal mechanism. Thus the number of necessary thresholds grows slowly with the
number of users.
Theorem 17. Let S (·) be any convex status function and let λ = min{κ∗, 12}. The badge
mechanism with quantile thresholds κ = (κ1, . . . , κm), where m = log
(
S(0)
Sn(λ)
)
≤ log(H) and
κ satisfies the following:
Sn (κm) =
S (0)
2
Sn (κt) =
Sn (κt+1)
2
=
S (0)
2m−t+1
∀t ∈ [2,m− 1]
κ1 = λ
achieves a 4-approximation to the total contribution of the optimal mechanism.
Proof. Let Opt be the expected user contribution of the optimal badge mechanism and Apx
the expected user contribution of the described absolute threshold mechanism. We will show
that the interim status allocation of a user with quantile q ≤ λ = min{κ∗, 12} in the described
absolute threshold mechanism is at least half of his interim status allocation in the optimal
mechanism. This property does not hold for q ≥ λ but we prove that the optimal mechanism
generates at most half of its contributions from users with q > λ. The 4-approximation result
then follows, by the virtual surplus characterization of total contribution.
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By proposition 7, we know that any q ≤ κ∗ has an interim status allocation of Sn (q) in
the optimal mechanism. We now prove that for any q ≤ λ, the interim status allocation in
this mechanism is at least half of the interim status allocation of the optimal mechanism.
First, consider any user with q < κm. By definition of this mechanism:
xˆ (q) = Sn (κm) =
S (0)
2
≥ S (q)
2
Next, consider any user with q ∈ (κt+1, κt] for t ∈ {2, ...,m − 1}.
xˆ (q) = Sn (κt) =
Sn (κt+1)
2
≥ Sn (q)
2
Finally, for any q ∈ (κ2, λ].
xˆ (q) = Sn (λ) =
S (0)
2m
=
1
2
·
(
S (0)
2m−1
)
=
1
2
· Sn (κ2) ≥ Sn (q)
2
Since this mechanism assigns non-zero status value only to users with q ≤ λ ≤ κ∗ and
xˆ (q) ≥ Sn(q)2 we get:
Apx =
∫ λ
0
R′(q) · xˆ (q) dq ≥ 1
2
·
∫ λ
0
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq
On the other hand the optimal mechanism achieves expected user contribution:
Opt =
∫ κ∗
0
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq
If κ∗ ≤ 1/2, then we get 2 ·Apx ≥ Opt.
If κ∗ > 1/2, then:
Opt =
∫ 1/2
0
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq +
∫ κ∗
1/2
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq
R′(·) and Sn (·) are both non-increasing functions of the quantile, so the following inequality
holds: ∫ 1/2
0
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq ≥
∫ κ∗
1/2
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq
and thereby:
Opt ≤ 2 ·
∫ 1/2
0
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq ≤ 4 ·Apx
A.4. Proofs from Section 7. THEOREM 12 For any convex status function, the leader-
board mechanism is a 2-approximation to the optimal mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 12 : Following similar reasoning as in Theorem 8, we can show that
such a complete relative ranking mechanism, will have a unique symmetric monotone equi-
librium. Under such an equilibrium a player with quantily q, will be ranked below all player
with lower quantile and above all players with higher quantile. Thus the interim status allo-
cation for a player with quantile q is Sn (q), as defined in Equation (3). Thus, the expected
user contribution will be:
(27) Apx =
∫ 1
0
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq
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whereas the optimal mechanism induces an interim status allocation of Sn (q) only for players
with q ≤ κ∗ and 0 otherwise, yielding an expected user contribution of Opt as given in
Equation (6). We will show that the convexity of the status function and the regularity of
the ability distribution imply that Opt ≤ 2 ·Apx.
By convexity of Sn (·), Sn (t · k + (1− t) · 1) ≤ tSn (k) + (1 − t)Sn (1). Instantiating this
for t = (1 − q)/(1 − κ∗) and recalling that Sn (1) = 0, we get that for any q ≥ κ∗ : Sn (q) ≤
Sn (κ
∗) · (1 − q)/(1 − κ∗). Since by definition R′(q) is non-positive for any q ≥ κ∗, we can
lower bound the negative part of Apx as follows:∫ 1
κ∗
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq ≥
∫ 1
κ∗
R′(q)
Sn (κ
∗)
1− κ∗ (1− q)dq
=
Sn (κ
∗)
1− κ∗
∫ 1
κ∗
R′(q)(1− q)dq
=
Sn (κ
∗)
1− κ∗
(
−R(κ∗)(1− κ∗) +
∫ 1
κ∗
R(q)dq
)
≥ − 1
2
· Sn (κ∗) · R(κ∗)
where the last inequality follows since, by the fact that R(q) is concave non-increasing in the
region [κ∗, 1] and the assumption that R(1) = 0, we have that
∫ 1
κ∗ R(q)dq ≥ 12R(κ∗) · (1−κ∗).
We can now lower bound Apx, using integration by parts:
Apx ≥
∫ κ∗
0
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq − 1
2
· Sn (κ∗) ·R(κ∗)
= R(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗)−
∫ κ∗
0
R(q) · S′n (q) dq −
1
2
· Sn (κ∗) ·R(κ∗)
=
1
2
·R(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗)−
∫ κ∗
0
R(q) · S′n (q) dq
≥ 1
2
·R(κ∗) · Sn (κ∗)− 1
2
∫ κ∗
0
R(q) · S′n (q) dq
=
1
2
∫ κ∗
0
R′(q) · Sn (q) dq = 1
2
Opt
where in the last inequality we also used the fact that S′n (q) ≤ 0.
A.5. Proof from Section 8. THEOREM 13 For any β ∈ [0, 1], the median badge mecha-
nism achieves a 4 approximation to the contribution of the optimal mechanism. The median
badge mechanism is implemented at the unique symmetric monotone equilibrium of the ab-
solute threshold mechanism defined by a contribution threshold of v(1/2)2 , when β ≥ 1/2 and
at some equilibrium for β < 1/2.
Proof of Theorem 13 : Let Opt be the expected user contribution of the optimal badge
mechanism and Apx the expected user contribution of the absolute threshold mechanism
with contribution threshold θ = v(1/2)2 . First we analyze the equilibrium induced by setting
a single badge threshold of θ (observe that our equilibrium characterization in Theorem 9
depends on the fact that we used β = 1). We focus on symmetric monotone equilibria, and
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thereby the equilibrium of such a mechanism is characterized by a quantile threshold κ, such
that all users with quantile q ≤ κ, submit θ, and all users with q > κ, submit 0.
By the indifference of the user at the boundary quantile κ, it must be that:
(28) v(κ) (1− β · κ)− θ = v(κ) (1− κ − β · (1− κ)) =⇒ v(κ) (κ · (1− 2β) + β) = θ
Observe that if β ≥ 1/2 then the left hand side is monotone-decreasing in κ and therefore
the equation has at most one solution. For β < 1/2, there might be multiple solutions and
thereby multiple equilibria. Consider setting θ = v(1/2)2 . Then Equation (28) has solution
κ = 1/2 independent of β and if β ≥ 1/2, it is the unique solution.
The expected user contribution achieved by the median quantile threshold equilibrium is:
(29) Apx = κ · θ = 1
2
· v(1/2)
2
=
R(1/2)
2
≥ R(κ
∗)
4
≥ 1
4
Opt
Where we used the fact that R(1/2) ≥ R(κ∗)/2, by the regularity of the distribution. More-
over, we used the upper bound on the optimal mechanism of R(κ∗). This fact can be seen as
follows: since S(te, tg) ≤ 1, the interim status allocation of any player is at most 1. No matter
what the optimal mechanism is, each user’s i expected contribution can be upper bounded
by:
Opti =
∫ 1
0
R′(q) · xˆi(q)dq =
∫ κ∗
0
R′(q) · xˆi(q)dq +
∫ 1
κ∗
R′(q) · xˆi(q)dq ≤ R(κ∗)
Since, the first integral in the left hand side of the last inequality is bounded above by R(κ∗)
(since R′(·) is non-negative), while the second integral is bounded above by 0 (since R′(·) is
non-positive).
THEOREM 14 For any β ∈ [0, 1], the badge mechanism that assigns a distinct badge
to each user in decreasing order of contribution, is always a 2-approximation to the total
contribution of the optimal mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 14 : Let Opt be the expected user contribution of the optimal badge
mechanism and Apx the expected user contribution of the complete relative ranking mecha-
nism. As argued in the proof of Theorem 12, such a complete ranking badge mechanism has
a unique equilibrium at which users are ranked in decreasing order of quantile. Therefore,
the interim status allocation of each user is simply: xˆ (q) = Sn(q) = 1− q and the expected
user contribution of the mechanism is:
Apx = −
∫ 1
0
R(q)xˆ′ (q) dq =
∫ 1
0
R(q)dq ≥ 1
2
·R(κ∗) ≥ 1
2
Opt,
where the second to last inequality follows by the same argument as in Theorem 10 and the
last inequality follows from the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 13.
A.6. Structure of Optimal Badge Mechanism under Different Tie-Breaking Rules.
Apart from the case of β = 1, discussed in Section 5, we show that the surplus-maximizing
allocation has a nice structure, when β takes values 1/2 or 0. Specifically, for the case of
β = 1/2, we show that assigning all users a distinct badge in decreasing order of value is
optimal. Hence, a complete ranking mechanism that assigns a distinct badge in decreasing
order of bid (without any contribution threshold) is optimal. Observe, that for β = 1, the
optimal mechanism also had a contribution threshold. For β = 0, we show that the optimal
mechanism groups together all users below the monopoly quantile in the same and highest
badge, and then assigns a distinct decreasing badge to all users above the monopoly quantile.
30 NICOLE IMMORLICA, GREG STODDARD, AND VASILIS SYRGKANIS
Such a mechanism can also be implemented at the unique symmetric monotone equilibrium
of an all-pay ranking mechanism, where user’s above some contribution threshold θ are all
assigned the top badge and all remaining users are ranked in decreasing order of contribution.
For other values of β, ex-post maximization of virtual surplus, can be very complex and
dependent on the exact instantiation of the virtual surplus profile of users.
Theorem 18. If β = 1/2, then the virtual surplus maximizing allocation assigns all users a
distinct badge in decreasing order of quantile (increasing order of ability). Such an allocation
is implemented at the unique equilibrium of a leaderboard mechanism.
Proof. To argue the first part of the theorem, we argue that for any instantiation of user
quantiles, the virtual surplus maximizing allocation is to assign a distinct badge to all users
in decreasing order of quantile. Similar to Lemma 6, it is easy to see that the badge should
be monotone non-decreasing in the virtual ability, since if R′(qi) > R′(qj) and ri < rj then
we can increase virtual surplus by swapping the badge of user i and user j. Additionally, if
for some set of virtual abilities R′(qi) ≥ R′(qi+1) ≥ . . . R′(qi+k) we have ri = . . . = ri+k then
by discriminating user i to a higher badge then we can argue that the virtual surplus will
increase: More concretely, for any j > i we can set r′j = rj + 1. The status value of all users
j > i+ k remains the same, while the satisfaction of each user j ∈ [i+ 1, i+ k] will decrease
by 12(n−1) . The status value of user i, will increase by
k−1
2(n−1) . Thus the net change in the
virtual surplus will be:
R′(qi)
k − 1
2(n − 1) −
1
2(n − 1)
k∑
j=i+1
R′(qj) ≥ 0
where the inequality follows since: R′(qi) ≥ R′(qj) for all j ∈ [i + 1, i + k]. Thus it must be
that each user is assigned a distinct badge.
The second part of the theorem is easy to see: The leaderboard mechanism falls into
the anonymous order-based framework of Chawla and Hartline [12], and hence it follows
that the mechanism will have a unique equilibrium which is symmetric and monotone. By
this fact, the bidders contributions will be decreasing in quantile and thereby the allocation
implemented by the auction at the unique equilibrium is the same as the direct mechanism
that ranks users in decreasing order of quantiles.
Theorem 19. If β = 0, then the virtual surplus maximizing allocation assigns all users with
quantile q ≤ κ∗ the highest badge and then assigns a distinct badge in decreasing order of
quantile (increasing order of ability) to all users with quantile q > κ∗. Such an allocation can
be implemented at the unique equilibrium of a badge mechanism that assigns the top badge to
all users that pass a contribution threshold of θ = v(κ∗) · κ∗ + ∫ 1κ∗ v(q)dq and then assigns a
distinct badge in decreasing order of contribution, to all users that don’t pass the contribution
threshold θ.
Proof. To argue the first part of the theorem, we argue that for any instantiation of user
quantiles, the virtual surplus maximizing allocation is to assign the highest badge to all users
with positive virtual ability and then order the remaining users in decreasing order of quantile.
Similar to Lemma 6, it is easy to see that the badge should be monotone non-decreasing in
the virtual ability, since if R′(qi) > R′(qj) and ri < rj then we can increase virtual surplus
by swapping the badge of user i and user j.
First it is easy to see that all users with non-negative virtual ability are assigned in the
optimal mechanism, with no loss of generality, to the highest badge: by such an assignment
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each virtual ability is multiplied by S (0), which is the highest possible status value that
could be assigned to a user. Thus by not assigning a user with a positive virtual ability the
highest badge, we are only multiplying his positive virtual ability by a smaller number and
this decrease is not counterbalanced by some increase in another users status value. Thus in
the optimal allocation, all users with positive virtual ability are assigned the highest badge.
Now consider a set of virtual abilities R′(qi) ≥ 0 > R′(qi+1) ≥ . . . ≥ R′(qi+k) with
ri = . . . = ri+k then by discriminating user i to a higher badge then we can argue that the
virtual surplus will increase: More concretely, for any j > i we can set r′j = rj + 1. The
status value of user i and any user above i remains unchanged, while the status value of user
j ∈ [i + 1, i + k], will decrease by a factor of 1n+1 . Since those users have negative virtual
ability, the virtual surplus will increase. Thus it must be that all negative virtual ability
users are assigned strictly lower badge than the positive virtual ability users.
Next we argue that all negative virtual ability users must be strictly ranked. Suppose
that for some set of virtual abilities 0 > R′(qi) ≥ . . . ≥ R′(qi+k), we assign ri = . . . = ri+k.
Then by assigning rj = rj + 1, to all users j > i, then the status value of user i will remain
unchanged, while the status value of all j > i, will decrease by 1n−1 . Since all those users
have negative virtual ability, the virtual surplus will increase. This completes the first part
of the theorem.
To show the second part of the theorem we first argue that the following mechanism has
a unique equilibrium: solicit contributions from the users. If a user’s contribution surpasses
a contribution threshold of θ, then he is assigned the highest badge n. All users whose
contribution is doesn’t pass threshold θ are assigned a distinct rank in decreasing order of
contribution, starting from rank n− 1 (breaking ties uniformly at random).
Given a contribution profile b, let w(b) = |j : bj < bi| and e(b) = |j : bj = bi|, be the
number of bidders that have strictly higher and and equal bid, correspondingly. Observe
that the status allocation of a user in the above mechanism as a function of his bid is:
(30) xi(b) =
{
1 if bi ≥ θ
1− w(b)n−1 − 12 e(b)−1n−1 if bi ≤ θ
The second case holds, since a user will be uniformly at random ordered among users of equal
rank and hence in expectation half of them will be ranked above him. Thus observe that the
status allocation of a user is only a function of his bid bi, and of the relative rank (w(b), e(b))
of his bid among other bids. This makes the auction fall exactly into the badge of anonymous
order-based auctions studied by Chawla and Hartline [12] and therefore, in the i.i.d. ability
setting it will have a unique equilibrium, which will be symmetric and monotone.
Thus it suffices to give a specific setting of θ, together with a symmetric bid equilibrium,
that will implement the virtual surplus maximizing allocation. Assuming that the mechanism
implements the virtual surplus maximizing badge allocation, we know by the equilibrium
characterization that the bid of each user, will be:
(31) b(q) =
{
v(κ∗) · κ∗ + ∫ 1κ∗ v(z)dz if q ≤ κ∗∫ 1
q v(z)dz if q > κ
∗
Observe that the equilibrium bid has a discontinuity at κ∗ and specifically, it jumps by
v(κ∗)·κ∗. This is due to the extra status that a player gains from passing the top contribution
threshold. For this bidding equilibrium to actually implement the claimed optimal direct
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allocation it must then be that:
(32) θ = v(κ∗) · κ∗ +
∫ 1
κ∗
v(z)dz
Under such a contribution threshold for the top badge, the equilibrium described previously
implements the virtual surplus maximizing allocation. Thus the bid function and the optimal
interim allocation of status satisfy the conditions of Lemma 4. To conclude that they are
actually an equilibrium we simply need to argue that no player wants to bid in the region
of bids that are not spanned by b(·), which is the region of bids in between the jump at κ∗.
This is trivially true, since for any such bid the player would prefer to bid
∫ 1
κ∗ v(z)dz. Thus
the latter pair of bid and interim allocation are an equilibrium and by uniqueness, the unique
equilibrium.
Last we note, that for other values of β, the ex-post virtual surplus maximizing allocation
of badges depends on the ex-post instance of the quantile profile and thereby doesn’t have
an ex-ante ranking or contribution threshold interpretation.
